

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

25X1

National Intelligence Council

NIC 02654-88

28 July 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Martin Roeber
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Estimate on Panama

1. ACTION REQUIRED: ~~Approval to begin a National Intelligence Estimate on Panama.~~

2. On 22 July I held an Intelligence Community meeting to discuss the efficacy and possible structure of a National Intelligence Estimate on Panama. On balance the representatives, with some reservations, agreed that an Intelligence Community product would be useful, but that it should not project out much beyond one year. Publication is set for late September 1988. [REDACTED]

25X1

3. Prior to the meeting I informally polled major players among both intelligence producers and consumers. The NSC and policymakers at State favor an Estimate. The Defense Intelligence Officer also supported an Estimate and found that the JCS and DOD policymakers also responded positively. USSOUTHCOM in Panama strongly supports doing an Estimate that looks out as far as possible. State/INR opposed it and Navy and NSA expressed some objections. [REDACTED]

25X1

4. At the meeting, those who argued most strongly for an Estimate--such as DIA--believed that an Intelligence Community coordinated assessment was necessary for informational purposes for senior officials and to aid in meeting the many briefing requirements. Others felt the failure to consider the many pieces of the Panamanian puzzle in one place left some potential gaps, notably no net assessment. Those who questioned the timing of an Estimate--led by State/INR--argued that analysts could not write a useful paper [REDACTED] In addition, INR believed the situation was too fluid and it would be difficult to produce an Estimate that did not read like a "policy options" paper. The NSA representative added that the sense in his Agency was that the Intelligence Community was still in a "warning mode" on Panama--not an estimative one--and there were too many potential variables and options. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

1

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET

25X1

5. After additional discussion, however, a consensus emerged in support of an Intelligence Community product. There was general agreement that it should focus both on the near-term tactics of the major players--Noriega, the military, and the opposition--as well as on the question of whether the impact of the crisis is bringing about a sea-change within Panama both in terms of the role of the armed forces and the economic and foreign policy orientation of the government.

25X1

Martin W. Roeber

CONCUR:

David Gries Sr.
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

July 28
Date

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

APPROVAL:

William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence

7/28/88
Date

SECRET

25X1

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

SNIE 84-88 PANAMA: PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE

FROM: A/NIO/LA

EXTENSION

NO.

NIC 02654-88

DATE

28 July 1988

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. NIC/PO

28/7

N

2. VC/NIC

21/7

DG

3.

v

4. ER

28 JUL 1988

W

5.

SA/DCI

7/29

7/29

W

6.

7.

DCI

8.

9.

NIO/LA

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

DCI
EXEC
REG